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JURISDICTION 
Respondents Dale Gurley and the Division of Peace Officer 
Standards and Training ("POST"), the Department of Public Safety 
and the State of Utah (hereafter "Respondents") disagree with the 
statement of jurisdiction contained in petitioner's brief. 
Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(a), authorizing appeals from "final 
orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings 
of state agencies." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1992 Supp.) 
(emphasis added). There was no final order reviewable by the Court 
of Appeals because there was no formal adjudicative proceeding at 
the agency level. There could be no adjudicative proceeding, 
because none is authorized by law for these circumstances. No 
hearing being authorized, no proceeding having commenced, no final 
order having issued, no appeal should be presented to this Court. 
Petitioner also claims this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Utah Code Ann. 
sections 63-46b-12 and -14, and Utah Administrative Code R728-409-
23. Rule 14 does not grant jurisdiction, it merely provides the 
procedure by which review is to be had "[w]hen judicial review by 
the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals is provided by statute of 
[sic] an order or decision of an administrative agency, board, 
commission, committee, or officer . • . •" Utah R. App. P. 14 (a). 
Section 63-46b-12 of the Utah Code merely states the procedure, 
again, by which review is to be had, as indicated by the section's 
title "Agency review—Procedure." Section 63-46b-14 of the Utah 
Code and R728-409-23 of the Administrative Code base jurisdiction 
on the existence of an agency final order, which was never issued 
under these facts because, again, no adjudicative proceeding ever 
commenced, nor was one ever authorized. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether an adjudicative proceeding by the Division of 
POST must be commenced upon receipt of a citizen's complaint 
against a police officer. 
2. Whether a final order from a formal adjudicative 
proceeding was issued by the Division of POST. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
When the only issues before the Court are issues of law, the 
standard of appellate review is correction of error. See Utah 
Dep't of Admin. Servs. v. Public Serv. Coirm'n, 658 P. 2d 601, 608 
(Utah 1983). When the issue before the Court is its own 
jurisdiction it reviews the applicable statutes afresh. See 
Scientific Academy of Hair Design, Inc. v. Bowen, 738 P. 2d 242, 
243-44 (Ct. App. 1987). Because there was no summary judgment or 
dismissal, those standards cited by petitioner are irrelevant. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(3)(a): 
Where the law applicable to the agency permits persons 
other than the agency to initiate adjudicative 
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proceedings, that person's request for agency action 
shall be in writing . . . . 
Administrative Rule 728-409-3: 
The division may initiate an investigation when it 
receives an allegation that grounds for refusal, 
suspension, or revocation of certification exist. The 
initial allegation may come from any responsible source, 
including, but not limited to those provisions of R728-
409-5. 
(Empha sis added.) 
Administrative Rule 728-409-5(B)(6): 
The initiation of an investigation may occur upon any of 
the following circumstances: 
(6) A complaint from a citizen which, on its face, 
appears to be a violation of section 409-3 above. 
(Empha sis added.) 
Administrative Rule 728-409-5(M): 
Final disposition of a case (i.e., close case, refer to 
department for follow-up action, refer for adjudicative 
proceeding, etc.) will be made by the bureau chief with 
the approval of the director. 
Administrative Rule 728-409-8(A): 
Except as otherwise permitted by Section 63-46b-20 and 
Rule R728-409-25, all adjudicative proceedings shall be 
commenced by notice of an Administrative Complaint 
accompanied by a Notice of Agency Action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case mistakenly appears before the Court as a result of 
petitioner's misconstruction of the rules of the Division of POST 
and of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"). POST is an 
agency created to ensure that police officers are qualified, 
trained, and that certain standards of performance are maintained. 
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A. Nature of the Proceedings Below. 
Petitioner wrote Post as authorized by Administrative Rule 
728-409-5(B)(6) on September 3, 1991, complaining about certain 
actions of police officer Dale Gurley. After thoroughly 
investigating the complaint and determining not to refer the case 
for adjudicative proceedings, the bureau chief and agency director, 
pursuant to Administrative Rule 728-409-5(M), issued a letter to 
petitioner on May 6, 1992, indicating the decision not to refer the 
case for an adjudicative proceeding. That should have been the end 
of the matter. Petitioner, however, exhibiting a lack of 
understanding of both the rules he cites and of UAPA, filed a 
"Motion for Reconsideration" at the agency level, and ultimately, 
this appeal on June 4, 1992. Respondents subsequently filed a 
motion for summary disposition on July 2, 1992, which this Court 
denied on October 13, 1992. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
The facts presented in petitioner's brief are irrelevant to 
this appeal because the only issues properly before the Court are 
issues of law. However, because petitioner's statement of facts is 
riddled with mischaracterizations, respondents are constrained to 
respond briefly. 
There are no uncontroverted facts as petitioner asserts. 
Petitioner refers to his "Verified Complaint," the complaint he 
made to POST regarding the actions of Officer Gurley, the facts 
contained within which he claims to be "uncontroverted" because, 
presumably, respondents filed no answer. POST filed no answer 
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because no answer was required by law. Petitioner's 'Verified 
Complaint" was a complaint only in the plain, everyday sense of the 
word. It was not a "Complaint" as a legal term of art, but a 
complaint as in an expression of dissatisfaction. It was not a 
"Complaint" before a judicial or administrative body. Because it 
was not a "Complaint," and did not trigger an adjudicative 
proceeding and the requirements of UAPA, no "Answer" was required 
by law. Therefore, no record has been created for this Court to 
review, nor are there uncontroverted facts as a part of any record. 
Petitioner has filed four lawsuits, all stemming from the acts 
of Officer Gurley in conjunction with his duties as a wildlife 
officer in dismantling a bird trap constructed from two by fours 
and chicken wire. Petitioner has filed two now consolidated 
actions in state court against Mr. Gurley alleging conversion and 
tortious interference with contract, Civil Nos., 90-0300-302 and 91-
0300-249, and two actions in federal court, one against Mr. Gurley, 
two attorneys general, Paul Van Dam in his personal capacity, the 
Division of Wildlife Resources, the State of Utah and the office of 
the Attorney General for an alleged violation of Mr. Nielson's 
civil rights, Civil No. 92-C-0485G, and one against a Von Leavitt, 
who was riding with Mr. Gurley the day in question, Civil No. 92-C-
0008B. The facts as developed to support these (now) three 
lawsuits are not simple, and would be a waste of this Court's time 
to review in substance. However, a few examples of the 
mischaracterizations Petitioner engages in follow. 
Mr. Nielson states that Officer Gurley is an adjudicated 
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perjurer. Petitioner's Brief at 9, 11, 29, 35. No order in any of 
the above proceedings exists finding Officer Gurley guilty of 
perjury. Mr. Nielson also claims that Officer Gurley "embarked on 
a pattern of conduct involving falsification of documents and 
perjury in an effort to conceal his wrongful conduct." 
Petitioner's Brief at 9. Just as there was no adjudication of 
perjury, neither were there findings that Officer Gurley backdated 
the report to which Mr. Nielson is referring in his brief. Without 
delving further into the facts, these two examples are offered as 
evidence of the very controverted nature of the facts as they exist 
in the civil cases brought by Mr. Nielson, and the fact that they 
should not form the basis for any decision by this Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court is being asked to find that any time a citizen 
files a complaint concerning an officer's actions POST must hold a 
hearing in order to protect the due process rights of the citizen 
making the complaint. Such a concept is incorrect as a matter of 
law and unacceptable as a matter of policy. 
The Division of POST was created to oversee the training and 
discipline of police officers. The fact that discretion as a 
matter of policy is necessary for POST to accomplish its charter is 
reflected by the statutes and rules governing POST. In order for 
a citizen to initiate an adjudicative proceeding, a statute or rule 
must authorize it. Neither statute nor rule applying to POST does 
so. This entire case results from petitioner's misunderstanding in 
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confusing what is authorization to initiate an investigation with 
authorization to initiate an adjudicative proceeding. An 
investigation is not an adjudicative proceeding. An investigation 
may result in an adjudicative proceeding or in a decision not to 
refer to an adjudicative proceeding—at the discretion of the 
agency. A citizen complaint cannct require the commencement of an 
adjudicative proceeding, bypassing the agency's discretion. 
Because the agency properly exercised its discretion in determining 
to close the case without an adjudicative proceeding, there was no 
adjudicative proceeding and therefore no final order. Given that 
there was no final order, there can be no appeal to this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. A Citizen Complaint Does Not Initiate an Adjudicative 
Proceedi na. 
A. UAPA governs state agency adjudicative proceedings. 
UAPA provides that adjudicative proceedings can be commenced 
in two ways: 
Except as otherwise permitted by Section 63-46b-20 
[referring to emergency procedures], all adjudicative 
proceedings shall be commenced by either: 
(a) a notice of agency action, if proceedings are 
commenced by the agency; or 
(b) a request for agency action, if proceedings are 
commenced by persons other than the agency. 
Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-3(l) (1989) (emphasis added). 
UAPA also explains that an adjudicative proceeding can only be 
commenced by an individual other than an agency by a Request for 
Agency Action: 
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Twlhere the law applicable to the agency permits persons 
other than the agency to initiate adjudicative 
proceedings . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(3)(a) (1989) (emphasis added). Thus, 
there must be' a statute or administrative rule permitting a person 
such as Mr. Nielson to initiate an adjudicative proceeding by a 
Request for Agency Action. 
B. The relevant POST statutes and rules actually preclude 
an individual's initiation of an adjudicative proceeding 
by a Request for Agency Action. 
UAPA itself does not provide a substantive right to an 
individual to initiate an adjudicative proceeding. Only another 
law applicable to the agency can permit a person other than the 
agency to initiate adjudicative proceedings. POST'S rules 
regarding discipline are very explicit concerning who can initiate 
an adjudicative proceeding: 
Except as otherwise permitted by Section 63-46b-20 
[emergency procedures] and Rule R728-409-25 [emergency 
proceedings]r all adjudicative proceedings shall be 
commenced by notice of an Administrative Complaint 
accompanied by a Notice of Agency Action. 
Administrative Rule 728-409-8(A) (1992) (emphasis added). As noted 
above, A Notice of Agency Action is a term of art for the mechanism 
used when adjudicative proceedings are initiated by the agency. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(l) (1989). The language of this rule 
clearly precludes initiation of an adjudicative proceeding by an 
individual's Request for an Agency Action. 
C. A citizen complaint initiates an investigation, not an 
adjudicative proceeding. 
The Petitioner has confused the process for initiating an 
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investigation by POST with the process for initiating an 
adjudicative proceeding. Administrative Rule 728-409-5(B)(6) 
clearly provides: 
The initiation of an investigation may occur upon any of 
the following circumstances; 
(6) A complaint from a citizen which, on its face, 
appears to be a violation of section 409-3 above. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Only an investigation may be initiated by a complaint from a 
citizen. 
Petitioner's mistake can be traced to his explanation of the 
"five levels" provided by the administrative rules for processing 
questions of police officer misconduct. Petitioner's Brief at 12-
14. 
Level one, as Mr. Nielson notes, is the allegation of 
misconduct, which is governed by R728-403-3 through -5. These 
rules provide that the agency may initiate an investigation upon 
receipt of information "from any responsible source" that grounds 
for discipline exist. Sources are listed in R728-409-5, among 
which is a citizen complaint. 
Level Two is the investigation itself. This level is governed 
by R728-409-5 and -6. The rules provide discretion to the agency 
concerning when to initiate an investigation, and some discretion 
concerning the progress of an investigation. It also provides that 
Final disposition of a case (i.e., close case, refer to 
department for follow-up action, refer for adjudicative 
proceeding, etc.) will be made by the bureau chief with 
the approval of the director. 
Administrative R728-409-5(M) (emphasis added). It is clear that 
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the decision regarding the final disposition of an investigation, 
i.e. whether it should be closed or referred for an adjudicative 
proceeding, is to be made by the bureau chief with the approval of 
the director, not by a presiding officer as stated by petitioner. 
Mr. Nielson claims, citing to no authority, that "[a]ny decision, 
including any decision to discontinue action, must be made by the 
'presiding officer' or the Council on Peace Officer Standards and 
Training . . . . Petitioner's Brief at 12. There is no mention of 
a presiding officer at this level nor any reference to an 
adjudicative proceeding. There is an unambiguous directive that 
the bureau chief may, at Level Two—the investigation—close the 
case or refer it for a future adjudicative proceeding. Mr. 
Nielson's references at Level Two to UAPA are premature. UAPA is 
not triggered until an adjudicative proceeding is actually 
commenced. An adjudicative proceeding was never held in this case. 
POST'S letter to Mr. Nielson indicated that the decision at Level 
Two was to close the case—an option clearly granted the director 
and bureau chief by R728-409-5(M). 
II• If There is No Adjudicative Proceeding, There is No Final 
Order, and if There is No Final Order. This Court has No 
Jurisdiction. 
The Court of Appeals' jurisdiction is governed by Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3. The provision complainant relies on is Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a), which states: 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies . . . 
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Thus, in order for jurisdiction to lie in this case, there must be 
a final order resulting from a formal adjudicative proceeding of a 
state agency• Short of this, the Court of Appeals simply has no 
jurisdiction• As detailed above, there was no adjudicative 
proceeding, thus no final order, and therefore this Court does not 
have jurisdiction over this matter. 
III. Petitioner Has No Due Process Rights in this Matter. 
Due process is guaranteed citizens of the United States by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which 
provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const, amend. XIV. 
The Utah Constitution also affords due process rights with the 
following similar language: "No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law," Utah Const, art. 
I, § 7. Thus, due process is dependent upon the possible 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property. Petitioner's life, 
liberty or property have never been at risk in this case. Were Mr. 
Nielson contesting the loss of his property and attempting to 
recover it, or were he attempting to receive damages, he would be 
entitled to a hearing because he would have property rights to 
protect. None of those rights were at stake in the agency 
proceeding below. What was at stake in the agency below was 
Officer Gurley's right to pursue his career, and thus Officer 
Gurley would have a due process right to a hearing if a suspension 
of his peace officer certification were being sought. A 
complainant such as Mr. Nielson simply has no rights at stake in 
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agency disciplinary actions that afford him due process 
protections. 
IV. An Agency Must Have Discretion to Proceed or Dispense With 
Disciplinary Proceedings. 
It is incredulous that a simple process for affording citizens 
a right to voice their concerns about police actions has been so 
misconstrued. The congestion that would be caused if indeed each 
and very citizen complaint were required to go to a formal 
adjudicative proceeding is unimaginable. Frankly, no one would be 
willing to become a police officer if faced with having to defend 
continually against unscreened complaints. Officers rightfully 
should have to defend themselves on those occasions where a 
screening has indicated a formal proceeding is appropriate. But 
POST must have the authority and discretion to screen citizen 
complaints. See General Motors v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Comm'n, 613 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (administrative agency's 
decision to conduct or not to conduct an investigation is committed 
to agency's discretion). 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Nielson is not entitled to an adjudicative proceeding or 
hearing of any kind to litigate his complaint against Officer 
Gurley. That does not mean, however, that Mr. Nielson is 
foreclosed from having whatever legitimate claims he may have heard 
in court. There is a forum in which Mr. Nielson can obtain his due 
process guarantees, a forum in which he may pursue any rights that 
may have been affected. That forum, however, is a civil suit where 
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Mr. Nielson may properly be a party to a suit. Mr. Nielson, in 
fact, has availed himself—thrice—of such a forum. There is no 
authority, statutory or by rule, nor should there be, that provides 
for every citizen who wishes to complain of police action, a right 
to an adjudicative proceeding where the decision to decertify or 
suspend the officer's POST certification would be at issue. 
Given that there was no adjudicative proceeding, the Court of 
Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction to review the discretionary 
determination of POST that there was no cause to refer Mr. 
Nielson's complaint against Officer Gurley to an adjudicative 
proceeding. This Court's appellate jurisdiction over agency action 
is limited to a review of an agency final order—i.e., an order 
obtained following a formal adjudicative proceeding. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ' day of December, 1992. 
R. Paul Van I uam 
Richard D.Uwyss 
Betsy L. Ross 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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